In the realm of panpsychism, many individuals often conflate it with idealism, which posits that consciousness is the essence of existence, and everything else is merely a manifestation within it. This perspective suggests that "everything is consciousness." Such views are frequently encountered in simplified interpretations of Eastern philosophies, like Buddhism, where physical entities such as atoms and electrons are seen as ultimately existing only within consciousness, rendering conscious experience as the sole reality we can access.

Recently, there has been a revival of philosophical discussions surrounding panpsychism. This newer interpretation asserts that while consciousness isn't the primary aspect of reality, it remains a fundamental element of the material world. In essence, this means that even the smallest particles, like atoms or electrons, possess some degree of consciousness.

Philip Goff is a key advocate of this perspective, having articulated his views in his well-known work, Galileo’s Error. Goff approaches panpsychism without a religious or spiritual agenda, positioning it as a serious philosophical alternative to the dilemmas posed by materialism and dualism. However, I contend that his arguments are fundamentally flawed.

Beginning with Goff's book, I found it intriguing to note that my upbringing in a Christian context made me familiar with a certain formula commonly found in apologetic literature—critiques of mainstream science and materialism, personal narratives revealing a crisis of meaning, followed by a somewhat superficial conclusion that affirms the initial claims.

Goff’s book, which spans 217 pages, doesn’t even mention panpsychism until page 111. The initial half is dedicated to outlining the shortcomings of materialism in explaining consciousness, a discussion that those acquainted with the topic will find tedious.

When Goff finally addresses panpsychism, he recounts a personal transformation. As a materialist in university, he describes a moment of awakening while in a bar, where the vividness of his experiences clashed with his scientific worldview. He claims this realization enabled him to reconcile his scientific understanding with his personal experiences, ultimately leading him to panpsychism.

While this narrative is certainly interesting, it doesn't hold much relevance for my critique. My previous assessment labeled his theory as "meta-materialism," where the hard problem of consciousness is merely replaced with the assertion that "atoms are conscious." This interpretation, I believe, still stands, and perhaps it is even more misguided than I initially thought.

Goff's central argument is straightforward: consciousness exists, and both dualism and materialism face significant problems. He proposes that consciousness provides answers to the intrinsic nature of matter, asserting that consciousness is the essence of all things. Notably, he clarifies that he doesn’t claim that objects like socks possess consciousness, but rather that they are composed of conscious entities.

His rationale hinges on a critique of materialism, suggesting that without a clear alternative, we are left with the choice between panpsychism and the vague notion of matter. This reasoning resembles a "God of the gaps" argument: lacking an explanation for the intrinsic nature of reality, we must conclude that electrons possess consciousness. This overlooks the essential truth that science operates on the assumption of existence, and while consciousness might address the ultimate nature of reality, specific claims require substantial support. It remains nearly impossible to justify the notion that an electron possesses consciousness—what does that even mean?

Moreover, Goff's argument presents a major flaw: consciousness is always directed towards something. In his conversion story, he describes tangible experiences—sounds, smells, and sensations—not an abstract concept of consciousness. Even if one were to argue that an electron has a minuscule form of consciousness akin to ours, what significance does that hold if an electron cannot be conscious of anything? It becomes an empty assertion devoid of meaning, a mere verbal construct that fails to relate to the consciousness we experience.

Goff further claims his version of panpsychism avoids dualism's pitfalls by suggesting that mass, charge, and spin are manifestations of consciousness. This assertion raises the question: if mass is a form of consciousness, then what exactly is consciousness? Our understanding of consciousness is tied to our subjective experience as individuals. While we may assume that animals possess consciousness due to their brains and sensory organs, consciousness is inherently singular and relational. To define mass as a form of consciousness is to strip the term of its meaning; Goff does not provide a satisfactory explanation, expecting readers to accept his terminology without question.

When confronted with the "combination problem," which inquires how the consciousness of individual atoms merges into the collective consciousness of humans or animals, Goff dismisses it with an overly simplistic remark. He acknowledges that while the issue is significant, it cannot be compared to the challenges facing materialism. Most panpsychists, he admits, have yet to fully resolve this dilemma, yet he insists that unlike materialism, there are no concerns about the logical coherence of panpsychism.

However, this is a blatant oversimplification. Goff has yet to define what consciousness truly is if electrons are conscious, and he also acknowledges the impossibility of explaining how these conscious electrons contribute to the very consciousness we experience. What accounts for the existence of brains if everything possesses consciousness? What about memory, identity, and the self—the I we perceive as the center of our consciousness?

Goff provides no clarity on these points. His book feels like an inadequate attempt to triumph over the failures of materialism, yet it lacks substantial justification for his proposed alternative. It resembles the typical progression in apologetic texts, moving from "science can't explain your experience" to "I experienced a miraculous transformation," ultimately culminating in an assertion devoid of evidence.

Goff argues that while materialists must navigate the subject-object divide, panpsychists only need to address the disparity between small and large consciousnesses. This reasoning is, frankly, frustratingly simplistic. Goff has not resolved the subject-object divide; he has merely asserted that electrons are conscious without substantiating this claim. By doing so, he has compounded the problems faced by materialists, dualists, and his own panpsychism simultaneously. The attention he dedicates to the "combination problem" is disappointingly brief, taking up less than four pages—less than the time spent detailing his conversion experience.

He briefly references split-brain experiments, suggesting they demonstrate the brain's capacity for housing multiple unified consciousnesses. This assertion is problematic on multiple levels: even if true, it only pertains to brain consciousness and does not provide evidence that division can lead to conscious electrons. Furthermore, there is no consensus on what truly occurs in split-brain patients. A 2017 study concluded that while visual perception may be split, it does not result in two independent conscious perceivers within a single brain.

Goff makes some speculative remarks about quantum entanglement, which do not warrant serious consideration. By the end of his book, he flippantly claims that panpsychism is a theory that resolves the consciousness problem once and for all. I beg to differ.

It is worth noting that Goff does not engage with the concept of idealism at all. He is fixated on crafting a logical argument against materialism, viewing panpsychism as the sole remedy, while neglecting other philosophical perspectives, such as those stemming from theism. For instance, Joshua R. Farris presents "theistic panpsychism" as a viable framework for understanding conscious subjects, arguing that it is better suited to address these issues than Goff's formulation. However, theistic panpsychism aligns more closely with idealism rather than existing as a distinct alternative to traditional philosophical options.

In conclusion, Goff's panpsychism does not offer a comprehensive ontological explanation; it merely presents itself as such. By claiming that intrinsic properties equate to consciousness without providing a substantive definition, it fails to establish a true ontological foundation. Goff's approach mirrors a materialistic perspective, substituting dualistic epiphenomenalism for a reversed framework where consciousness is prioritized rather than relegated to the end of the causal chain. It does not address profound questions of free will, causation, or the meaning of human existence. Ultimately, it remains, as I previously stated, "meta-materialism… with the hard problem scribbled out and 'atoms are conscious' written in the margin." By the conclusion of Goff's book, I find myself no closer to understanding, nor do I believe Goff is either.