Orthodox economics operates under the premise that economic dynamics can be modeled similarly to physical laws, particularly those of Newtonian mechanics. This perspective posits that economic events can be explained through rigid equations or "laws" that define their essence, even when real-world complexities obscure that essence.

However, the scientific interpretation of "laws of nature" is itself questionable. This raises the concern that the orthodox economist’s enthusiastic defense of capitalism is grounded more in ideology—whether theological or moral—than in empirical science. While true scientists may navigate this murky territory without invoking a supernatural lawgiver, their reliability stems from their ability to solve problems and advance human welfare. In contrast, the field of economics, which aims for precision through mathematical frameworks but lacks such societal benefits, risks appearing disingenuous.

Laws of nature, particularly those described as "ceteris paribus," acknowledge exceptions, likening them to Aristotelian tendencies toward an optimal state. Social laws, such as prohibitions against theft or murder, also have exceptions, as criminals frequently violate them. These laws serve as prescriptive rather than descriptive guidelines—indicating what should not occur, even if it does. A perfect adherence to these laws, one might argue, exists only in a divine context.

Aristotle introduced a concept of "final causes," suggesting that all natural phenomena could be explained through a purpose or ultimate end. This view imbues nature with an almost animated quality, where causes and effects carry inherent values. For Aristotle, certain actions, such as theft, are detrimental to humanity, while others, such as bravery, are beneficial. He envisioned nature as a progression toward an optimal condition, with various elements aspiring to excel within their categories.

Returning to physics, the physicist's concept of natural laws is entwined with this contentious teleological backdrop. Scientists may cling to the notion of "laws" more due to tradition than to confront the implications of their discoveries—namely, the absence of a divine lawgiver or a predetermined endpoint for natural processes. Under scientific materialism, values are subjective projections rather than inherent qualities of nature.

While Aristotle might have agreed that values are projections, he would argue they are necessary for understanding phenomena. Our comprehension is incomplete if we disregard the potential for natural teleology in physical processes. Even as intuitive as our personifications of natural processes may be, scientific objectivity demonstrates that such intuitions can be bypassed. The universe, thus, can seem alien and indifferent, with natural changes occurring without moral consideration, making objective patterns appear dispassionate and lifeless.

In this context, economic "laws" take on a similar ambiguity. For example, the neoclassical theory posits a general equilibrium in capitalist markets, where supply meets demand, and all parties maximize their utility. Any disruption to this balance, like taxation, could lead to inefficiencies. Adam Smith’s concept of the invisible hand suggests that unregulated markets will naturally reach this equilibrium, where rational self-interested actions align to maximize collective happiness.

The question arises: are these laws descriptive or prescriptive? Do they imply a teleological purpose for economic transactions? Yes, as they advocate for the maximization of utility, a goal rooted in ethical considerations. Nevertheless, economics purports to be an objective science, not a branch of moral philosophy.

Economists often contend that happiness is a societal good, and they analyze systems designed to achieve it. While economies can be artificially regulated, orthodox economists argue that the most effective economy is the one that arises from natural human competition for limited resources. This scenario postulates an inherent rationality among individuals, leading to cooperative behavior within a free market.

However, if free markets are indeed natural, then discussing the merits of capitalism scientifically becomes problematic. The merit of capitalism should be evaluated based on human interests rather than an assumed natural order. If we accept happiness as a universal objective, various methods may exist to achieve it, but these methods are not inherently natural.

A more nuanced understanding of nature reveals a distinction between the indifferent natural world and the socially constructed realm humans create. The autonomy and creativity of individuals allow for the establishment of social orders that often defy natural constraints. This delineation separates the rigorous methods of natural sciences from the more ethically complex inquiries of social sciences.

Economists often navigate between these realms, attempting to classify their discipline as a natural science akin to physics. Yet, capitalism—an artificial construct born from human choices—cannot be ascribed the same natural status as gravity. The economic defense of capitalism echoes medieval theological arguments, which deemed certain behaviors as aligned with "natural law," an idea that blurred the distinction between the natural and the artificial.

The legitimacy of the term "natural" is multifaceted, encompassing notions of spontaneity and appropriateness. However, neither interpretation substantiates the claim that economic study parallels the rigor of natural sciences. While happiness may be a universal goal, the methods to achieve it vary widely, and human creativity renders all economic plans equally "unnatural."

Thus, the economist’s endorsement of capitalism resembles the theologian’s justification of specific moral codes, suggesting an ideological agenda rather than an objective analysis of economic realities. Although economists gather statistical data to support their theories, these data reflect human choices and emergent properties shaped by culture and history, not immutable natural laws.

Ambiguities between nature and society, as well as between natural and social laws, offer rhetorical advantages. Such equivocation allows one to present a facade of neutrality while subtly incorporating value judgments into discourse. Unlike the medieval theologians who presumed divine oversight over nature, modern scientists seek to understand the universe devoid of such assumptions.

The concept of "natural function" presupposes inherent purposes that do not exist in a mindless universe. While capitalism can be utilized for various ends, its efficacy depends on the goals pursued. The notion of happiness in economic terms often serves as a vague placeholder.

Classical economists associated happiness with personal pleasures, while neoclassical economists adopted a broader interpretation of utility. As demonstrated by the Sonnenschein–Mantel–Debreu theorem, multiple equilibria can exist within markets, indicating that societal outcomes may not reflect individual rational actions. This complexity undermines the simplistic view that markets are self-correcting and optimal.

Despite the superficial simplicity of market interactions, human behavior is inherently intricate. Individuals are not solely motivated by self-interest; they also care about others, leading to unpredictable market dynamics. The diversity of motivations ensures that a singular, optimal market state is unattainable, with fluctuations driven by competing interests.

In conclusion, orthodox economics lacks the scientific rigor it claims. Models that cannot yield falsifiable predictions resemble ideologies more than sciences. This resemblance raises concerns about the propagandistic nature of economic theories, which often align with the interests of the wealthy elite. Ultimately, capitalism, while imperfect, is presented as the best available system, supported by a facade of scientific legitimacy that may no longer hold weight in the face of observable realities.