Exploring Metaphysics: Views of David Manley and David Chalmers
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In the realm of contemporary philosophy, David Manley posits that “most current metaphysicians focus on the reality being depicted” rather than on “language and thoughts.” Conversely, some analytic philosophers argue that a significant portion of analytic metaphysics is “superficial” and “merely verbal,” asserting that such claims lack “truth-evaluability.”
Professor Manley, from the University of Michigan, states that “[m]ost contemporary metaphysicians regard their work as primarily concerned with the reality that is represented, rather than the representations of language or thought.” He further notes that this perspective in mainstream metaphysics has only recently gained prominence and continues to face substantial criticism.
Manley elaborates that metaphysics delves into the very foundations of reality. He raises critical questions, including: Are there abstract entities like numbers and properties in addition to concrete objects? Is there a cause for every event? What defines possibility and necessity? When do multiple entities constitute a single larger entity? Do past and future exist?
This leads to a provocative counterargument:
> The notion of “foundations of reality” is absurd.
Such assertions prompt further inquiries about the idea of “the nature of the world” (as opposed to the plural “natures”) and challenge the necessity of distinguishing between abstract and concrete objects. Some metaphysicians might even question the existence of events in the same way some deny the existence of objects.
Despite these challenges, these inquiries may still allow for discussions around “the foundations of reality” and “the nature of the world.” After all, philosophical discussions must have a starting point, and even if a metaphysician rejects Manley’s definitions, many—if not most—metaphysicians might still embrace these basic distinctions.
In a fundamental sense, Manley’s description can be interpreted as a classic form of metaphysical realism, which may surprise some philosophers given its current status as a prevailing paradigm among contemporary metaphysicians. However, metaphysical anti-realism remains a valid alternative.
Interestingly, even those metaphysicians who prioritize “the reality that is represented” often engage with contemporary scientific insights about reality. As W.V.O. Quine suggested, physics informs us of “what exists,” and thus metaphysical realists should heed this information. Yet, even metaphysicians deeply committed to scientific findings have adopted various anti-realist stances.
Manley underscores the significance of science, particularly physics, for metaphysical realists, asserting that “the preferred methodology for addressing these questions is quasi-scientific, as recommended by W.V.O. Quine and developed by David Lewis.”
Strong Deflationism
Skeptics of what is now termed “analytic metaphysics” often align with Manley’s concept of “strong deflationism.” This position critiques analytic metaphysics, though it remains uncertain if those who are critical of metaphysics would be concerned with such a stance.
Analytic metaphysics, contrary to what the name suggests, is not merely metaphysics practiced by analytic philosophers. It represents a specific type of metaphysics situated within the broader scope of analytic philosophy. Not every metaphysician who identifies as an analytic philosopher engages in analytic metaphysics, and some philosophers may dispute this distinction altogether.
Returning to strong deflationism—an idea also discussed by American philosopher Theodore Sider in his work “Ontological Realism”—this stance remains a metaphysical viewpoint. Any perspective on the world inherently includes metaphysical assumptions or beliefs.
What exactly is strong deflationism? According to Manley, it is characterized by the belief that “motivated by intuitions of shallowness, proponents argue that the debate is merely verbal, or that the disputants are not making truth-evaluable claims at all.”
Is all analytic metaphysics merely verbal? Possibly not. One might argue that there exists an objective way the world is, regardless of our linguistic constructs.
Consider this:
> 1) We engage with the world using language, concepts, and theories, all of which are influenced by our sensory experiences. Nevertheless, there remains a way the world truly is.
> 2) Even if our understanding of the world is mediated through language and concepts that may alter our perception, there still exists a way the world is.
Moreover, what does it mean for analytic metaphysics to exhibit “shallowness”? What aspects are considered shallow by realist metaphysicians? What claims can they make that transcend superficiality?
Is it plausible for any dispute to be “merely verbal”? If so, what constitutes a metaphysical or philosophical claim that is truth-evaluable, and what criteria determine its truth-evaluability?
These inquiries require responses that incorporate metaphysical elements, as critics of metaphysical realism may not entirely reject their own metaphysical commitments.
Despite these challenges, Manley asserts that “in its new forms, strong deflationism continues to pose a significant challenge to metaphysics.”
Mild Deflationism
Manley describes the “mild deflationist” stance as somewhat elusive. Mild deflationists recognize that there are genuine disputes but believe these can be resolved trivially by reflecting on conceptual or semantic factors. They argue that nothing substantial remains for metaphysicians to examine.
Yet, how can genuine disputes be entirely settled through conceptual reflection? While concepts and semantics are undoubtedly important, they cannot encapsulate the entirety of philosophical discourse.
Can any dispute genuinely be “merely verbal”? This notion seems overly simplistic. If disputes were solely about semantics, no one would believe that any disagreement could be reduced to mere linguistic differences—unless the remaining issues were trivial by semantic definition.
The only context where this might hold true is within linguistic idealism or similar frameworks, though its validity remains dubious.
Manley concludes his assessment of mild deflationism by noting that proponents of this view are often more motivated by a sense of triviality than the belief that nothing substantial is at stake in the dispute.
He further remarks that mild deflationists claim that “[n]either side” in a metaphysical disagreement can assert a claim with a determinate truth-value. This implies a shift away from the merely verbal, as the mild deflationist must be making a metaphysical assertion about the nature of reality. If neither position can be truth-evaluable, this suggests that the mild deflationist is still navigating the realm of metaphysics.
Now, let’s delve into some of the metaphysical issues contemporary philosophers either emphasize or downplay, using David Chalmers’ insights as a reference point.
David Chalmers on Verbal Disputes and Metaphysical Trivia
Australian philosopher David Chalmers has explored the topic of “verbal disputes” in his writings. This discussion has been revisited by numerous philosophers who question whether certain philosophical issues are merely linguistic in nature—a debate that extends back through history, notably criticized by logical positivists in the early 20th century.
In contemporary discussions, the label of “merely verbal” is frequently directed at analytic metaphysics. Chalmers addresses these concerns, albeit without naming specific individuals or explicitly referring to “analytic metaphysics.”
Chalmers raises questions about the classification of a “random book-like” entity—whether it qualifies as a book or merely a collection of particles arranged in a book-like manner.
Chalmers presents a scenario involving two philosopher-scientists, Smith and Jones. Both have access to identical facts regarding a particular state of affairs, yet they arrive at differing conclusions about it. This disparity indicates that their interpretations extend beyond the empirical data, incorporating theoretical frameworks, prior beliefs, and semantic considerations.
While the given facts may be clear, it does not imply that our descriptions of them are equally straightforward. In fact, the perceived separation between facts and our interpretations of them invites further scrutiny.
Chalmers argues that not only are our interpretations indeterminate, but the facts themselves can also be indeterminate. This aligns with a well-recognized phenomenon in the philosophy of science, where identical evidence can lead to a multitude of theories—a situation known as the underdetermination of theory by data.
Chalmers also introduces the concept of “stipulation.” When we define the meaning of a term, our conclusions about facts and evidence may follow from those stipulations. However, this invites criticism, as some might contest the idea that stipulative definitions can dictate what we consider to be factual.
Chalmers humorously illustrates this point with an analogy about defining “world peace” as “a ham sandwich,” emphasizing that while such definitions may simplify discussions, they ultimately lack substance.
Focusing on specific examples, Chalmers poses the question:
> “Is a cup-shaped object made of tissues a cup?”
This raises additional inquiries:
> “If something functions as a cup, does that inherently make it a cup?”
> “What if this cup-shaped object was not intentionally designed to be a cup?”
Chalmers’ central argument suggests that regardless of intent, if an object holds liquid and resembles a cup, it should be classified as such. The distinction, then, may hinge on terminological choices rather than inherent qualities.
Chalmers also asks:
> “Is a book-like entity that formed randomly a book?”
This question mirrors the infinite monkey theorem, suggesting that given enough time, random events may yield coherent outcomes. Chalmers argues that if the object resembles a book and contains coherent text, it should be considered a book, regardless of its origin.
Through these discussions, Chalmers illustrates the nuanced debates present within analytic metaphysics, where language, conceptual frameworks, and the nature of reality intertwine.